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ARGUMENT

I.

The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Payoff Letter Was
Not Voidable Through an Actionable Unilateral Mistake
A.

The Payoff Letter Is or Reflects an Agreement between
Nationstar and Borrower that Can Be Rescinded

Emerald (the Borrower's assignee) suggests that the Payoff Letter cannot be
\/JP

rescinded for a unilateral mistake because it supposedly "was not a written
contract that altered the status of the parties or the putative debt." (Emerald Br. at
11). Not so for several reasons.
The first reason, as Veripro argued in the trial court (R. 169-75), is that the
vii

Payoff Letter--as a commitment by a financial institution to "modify an obligation
to repay money" or "make any other financial accommodation"--was a "credit
agreement" within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4(2)(a)(i)(A). While
Emerald disputed below that this section of the Utah Statute of Frauds applied, it
never suggested that the Payoff Letter was not an agreement. (R. 175-80; 186-87;
193-204) (argument of Emerald's counsel devoid of any contention that Payoff
Letter not an agreement). Emerald's failure to contest in the trial court Veripro's
assertion that the Payoff Letter was an agreement undermines its argument on
appeal that the Payoff Letter is not a rescindable instrument.

~

The second reason the Payoff Letter qualifies as a voidable contract is that it
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1s the functional equivalent of an accepted offer: Borrower proposed that
Nationstar confirm in a written instrument that it would not pursue collection of an
owed debt, and Nationstar agreed (mistakenly) to do so. An accepted offer
obviously constitutes a contract. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P. 2d 1384, 1386 (Utah
1977).
Another reason the Payoff Letter should be treated as a rescindable contract
is that the trial court itself characterized it as such. See Feb. 13, 2017 Order (R.
135-41), ~ 36 ("Assuming the payoff letter is considered an 'agreement' between
Nationstar and Stantyn [the Borrower], there is no allegation that Nationstar

"issued the letter due to fraud or other inequitable conduct.")1 (emphasis added).
A final reason to reject Emerald's apparent argument that only bilateral
agreements can be rescinded is that Utah law routinely allows non-contract
instruments (such as deeds) to be voided or reformed on the basis of mistake. See,
e.g., Grahan v. Gregory, 800 P. 2d 320, 325-27 (Utah 1990) (affirming trial

court's reformation of deed). And it appears that even a unilateral tender of
payment is voidable on the basis of mistake. Southern Title Guar. Co. v. Bethers,
~

1

Although the trial court concluded in the next paragraph that the Payoff Letter "is not an agreement that cancelled
the debt" (R. 139, ~ 37), the court's reference to "not an agreement" appears to be directed primarily at the issue of
whether Nationstar merely charged off the Loan through an internal accounting entry coded as "Prin. Non-Cash
Adjustm [sic]" and "Payoff Nocash" (NATIONSTAR0000012 & 49) or instead meant to cancel the debt and
thereby discharge Borrower from liability on the Loan. The reference, in other words, is not focused on whether
the Payoff Letter is an agreement between Nationstar and Stantyn. It clearly is. Seep. 1 above.
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~

761 P.2d 951, 955 (Utah App. 1988) (declining to decide whether a tendered
"payment should be voidable as a mutual mistake" only because the issue was not
~

preserved below).
Whatever else can be said about the Payoff Letter, if it is nothing more than
a written confirmation of "an existing state of fact," as Emerald contends (Emerald
Br. at 11 ), that "fact" was not accurate. The Payoff Letter's statement that
Nationstar had "received payment in full for the [Loan]" (Addendum 4) is, as
shown below, plainly incorrect.
. B.

VIP

The Trial Court's Own Factual Findings Establish that
Bo"ower Knew the PayoffLetter Was Mistakenly Issued

Veripro is not, as Emerald suggests,· challenging any of the trial court's
factual findings. There is no finding, after all, that purports to determine that
~

Borrower did not know the Payoff Letter was a mistake. Indeed, several findings
based on extensive direct and circumstantial evidence show that Borrower
understood he was the beneficiary of a huge ($54,000-plus) windfall when he
received the Payoff Letter. They include the following established facts:
• By 2015 the Loan was and had been in default, and Nationstar
decided to internally write off, as opposed to cancel, the entire owed
balance (R. 137,

,r

15; 138,

~

27). It did so through a March 2015
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accounting entry of "Prin. Non-Cash Adjustm" and "PayoffNocash."
(R.137, ,r 15).
• Borrower always understood the Loan had not been repaid, as "it is
undisputed that [Borrower] knew that he did not 'write a check' to
pay off the [L]oan." (R. 139, ,r 36).
• When Borrower filed for bankruptcy in early 2016, he listed the Loan
as an owed secured debt of $76,000. (R.183:24-185:10; Addendum 2
at 11 of 38). Emerald adduced no evidence to suggest that Borrower
ever amended his schedules or statement of affairs to delete
Nationstar as a creditor generally, or that he took any action to notify
the bankruptcy court of such a substantial reduction in his debt load,
specifically. It is a reasonable, even irresistible, inference that
Borrower effectively considered as too-good-to-be-true Nationstar's
two telephonic statements (on July 15 and August 8, 2016, see
Findings 11 & 16) that the Loan balance was zero and he was being
miraculously released from a debt that he scheduled at $76,000.
• On the topic of Borrower's communications with Nationstar, the
Collection Profile (Addendum 3 at NATIONSTAR000018-52) reflects
a total of four telephone calls from Borrower to discuss the status of the
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Loan. Importantly, the Profile confirms that in the first call on March 9,
2015 (the same day Nationstar internally noted that the Loan was
approved for a "Prin. Non-Cash Adjustm" and "Payoff Nocash" (R.
137, , 15)), "Nationstar declined [Borrower's] request for a payoff
letter ... because 'acct was not paid in full but [merely] charged off."'
(R. 138, ,r 27). Borrower, therefore, well knew then that Nationstar did
not consider the Loan paid. He could not possibly think otherwise
when he had been chronically delinquent, when he had not made any
payments after November 30, 2014 (NATIONSTAR000013, entry 54),
paid, and when he scheduled the entire Loan balance (and then some)
on his bankruptcy scheduled.
• The Collection Profile further reflects that Borrower waited some
sixteen months to initiate a second call to Nationstar (R. 136, ,r 11) to
seek an answer he hoped would be different from what he previously
had been told. His wish was realized on July 15, 2016 when a
Nationstar "representative informed [Borrower] that there was not a
0P

balance owing under the loan." (R. 136, , 12). This notification would
have made no sense given the- fact that (a) Borrower had made no
payments on the Loan after he was told in March 2015 that he was not
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entitled to a payoff letter, and (b) Borrower later sought to discharge
the Loan in banlcruptcy--a debt that he certified under penalty of
perjury was $76,000. See Addendum 2 at 11 of 38.
• After that second call from Borrower in July 2016, Nationstar still did
not issue a payoff letter, so Borrower tried a third time (three weeks
later on August 8, see R. 137, 1 16) to finesse the coveted instrument.
Once again the letter did not materialize, so Borrower called a fourth
time a month later on September 6, 2016 (R. 137,120). His obsessive
persistence finally worked: Nationstar at last sent the Payoff Letter,
which stated the plainly inaccurate "fact" that Nationstar had "received
payment in full for the [Loan] on 3/19/2015." (R. 137, 1 21). Give.n
Borrower's knowledge that "he did not 'write a check' to pay off the
Loan" (R. 13 9,

1 36), he

certainly grasped the obvious inaccuracy of

the Payoff Letter's statement that "payment in full" had been made.
In light of (a) these factual findings, all of which Veripro accepts, (b) the
undisputed evidence underlying these findings, and (c) the absence of any finding
that Borrower actually believed he was entitled to the Payoff Letter, Veripro does
not need to challenge and is not challenging any factual determination. It is only
contesting the trial court's legal conclusion that the Payoff Letter was validly issued
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and cannot be rescinded through the Guardian State Bank doctrine of unilateral
mistake.
These factual fmdings, as entered, simply do not support the legal conclusion
that the Payoff Letter's acknowledgment of "payment in full for the [Loan] on
3/19/2015" (Addendum 4) is irrevocably binding on Nationstar and its collection
agent, Veripro. Nor does it support the conclusion that Nationstar's mistake cannot
be equitably rectified. Since Veripro does not challenge the fmdings--only the legal
conclusions flowing from the findings--marshaling the evidence is not necessary.

c.

The Trial Court Did Not Find that Nationstar Failed to
Exercise Ordinary Diligence

Emerald next suggests that Veripro' s right to rescind the Payoff Letter is ·
''unavailing" because Nationstar supposedly failed to "exercise[e] ordinary diligence
when it responded to Borrower's three 2016 telephone inquiries and ultimately
issued the Payoff Letter. (Emerald Br. at 11 n. 1). This suggestion lacks merit for at
least two reasons.
First, it is not entirely clear whether Utah law requires a party seeking
~

rescission based on unilateral mistake to prove that it was reasonably diligent.

Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 P. 2d 1, 7-8 (Utah 1989), after all, seems to hold
that a showing of reasonable diligence is necessary, if at all, only when third-party
rights may be infringed by granting equitable relief against an instrument. Here, the
7
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trial court correctly rejected Emerald's argument that rescinding the Payoff Letter
would harm any third-party. (R. 139,

'if

38: because "all of Nationstar's

representations were made to [Borrower] and not to Emerald[,] the Court finds the
representations by Nationstar to [Borrower] were not intended to be relied upon by
third-parties"). Guardian also is clear that when a party receives a "pure windfall" if
~

the transaction stands, and when the recipient of the unexpected gift
"overreach[es]," then the instrument that facilitates the windfall can be equitably
~

attacked without proof that the "donor" acted with reasonable diligence.2
Second, and more importantly, the trial court made no finding that Nationstar
failed to exercise reasonable diligence when it decided to issue the Payoff Letter
which, contrary to its internal records, acknowledged receipt of "payment in full."
The absence of such a finding below precludes Emerald from invoking a reasonable
diligence argument on appeal. The trial court got it wrong in refusing to rescind the
Payoff Letter, and this Court should reject Emerald's suggestion that Nationstar
somehow failed to exercise due diligence and does not qualify for equitable relief.

2

Additional Utah cases appear to take the same tact. See, e.g., Tolboe Const. Co. v. Staker Paving & Const. Co.,
682 P. 2d 843, 846 (Utah 1984) (affirming relief from patently obvious and "palpable" mistake in submission of
construction bid that was nearly 300 percent below next lowest bid); Thompson v. Smith, 620 P. 2d 520, 524
(Utah 1980) (no inexcusable neglect where party took "unfair advantage" of the other); Red Bridge Capital, LLC,
v. Dos Lagos, LLC 2016 UT App. 162, ~ 15, 381 P. 3d 1147, 1151 (reversing trial court decision to reject
unilateral mistake claim where benefitted party "attempt[ed] to take advantage of the mistake"). However, other
Utah cases go the other way, holding that one element of a rescission claim founded on unilateral mistake is that
"generally'' the mistake occurred despite the "exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the mistake."
John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P. 2d 1205, 1209 (Utah 1987).
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D.

Veripro's Right to Rescind the Payoff Letter Does Not Require
Proof that Borrower Defrauded Nationstar, Only that He
Knew of the Mistake

Emerald's contention that "the evidence did not show that 'Nationstar sent
the letter based on a misrepresentation or other fraudulent conduct by
[Borrower]"' (Emerald Br. at 12) ignores Gust as the trial court did) the Guardian
State Bank principle that mere "knowledge of the mistake by the other party" is

enough to establish an actionable unilateral mistake. 778 P. 2d at 5. Veripro was
entitled to rescind the Payoff Letter if it proved that Borrower knew it was
mistakenly issued. Veripro did so. See pp. 3-5 above.
E.

Borrower Has Not Rebutted Veripro's Argument that the
Trial Court Conflated the Concepts of Internal Chargeoff of
Debt on the One Hand, and Actual Release of Debtor from
Liability, on the Other

Emerald did not address Verirpro' s opening argument that the trial court
mistakenly failed to differentiate between the accounting principle that an entity
Gw

can remove an asset (credit) from its balance sheet through a book entry, on the
one hand, and the legal proposition that ordinarily an internal writeoff is not a

~

discharge of the debtor, on the other. Emerald's failure to engage on this issue is
telling. It is an implicit concession that the trial court's conclusion that "Nationstar
is not entitled to any of the Proceeds because it charged off the loan and cancelled
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the debt" (R. 138, , 29) is legally indefensible. If Emerald won't defend the
conclusion, the Court should not either.
CONCLUSION

The trial court's decision to award the post-foreclosure sale proceeds to
Emerald cannot stand. Its ruling is unrooted in Utah law. It inexplicably allows a
large financial windfall to a party fully aware that the Payoff Letter it repeatedly
requested and long failed to receive was issued in error. It rewards precisely the
same knowing, inequitable conduct that the Supreme Court has long held should
be discouraged. The ruling should be reversed with instructions to award the
proceeds to Nationstar' s collection agent Veripro.
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